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IMPERFECT TAKINGS
Shai Stern *
ABSTRACT

Three concerns are inherent to the power of eminent domain —
when a government forcibly takes away private property to provide a
social good: abuse of this power, unfair distribution of burdens among
members of society, and inefficient implementation of the
government project. To protect against these undesirable outcomes,
expropriation laws in most Western jurisdictions incorporate three
safeguards: due process, a public use requirement, and mandatory
compensation. While jurisdictions implement these safeguards in
different ways, most demand their implementation as a prerequisite
for legitimate expropriation. Arguably, the purpose of allowing
governments to expropriate private property is to provide for
important societal needs. But this conflicts with the idea that the
government ought to perfectly adhere to the three aforementioned
safeguards at all times. Imperfect circumstances, such as times of
crisis, likely require governments to provide for the needs of their
citizens, but afford insufficient time for standard due process.
Imperfect implementation of the three safeguards may also be
necessary when authorities struggle with budgetary limitations that
prevent full compensation, or when they are unable to meet a social
need without the involvement of private entities. In all these
imperfect circumstances, at least one of the safeguards might be
compromised if the government is to provide required social needs
through expropriation.
This Article proposes a novel model to conceptualize eminent
domain, which identifies an interplay among expropriation laws’ three
*
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safeguards. It further recognizes that each of these safeguards
protects, to some extent, against all three of the potential dangers
inherent in government’s expropriation power. This innovative
interplay model legitimizes compromise, such that it is appropriate
for there to be only partial implementation of one safeguard as long
as the other two are strictly applied. The interplay model proposed in
this Article, therefore, allows the government to exercise its
expropriation power properly even in imperfect circumstances, while
still sufficiently protecting property owners and society from abuse of
that power.
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INTRODUCTION
Takings law, the power of the government to acquire property
from unwilling property owners to further its citizens’ needs and
interests, is well-rooted in American property jurisprudence. 1
Through this power, the government aims to overcome obstacles
threatening its ability to fulfill the essential needs of its citizens, such
as sidewalks, roads, educational institutions, medical institutions, and
workplaces. These essential needs of society often require the
purchase of land for their implementation. For example, if the
government aims to build a new highway, it must purchase the land
on which the highway is to be built. Clearly, it is desirable to realize
these essential goals in an agreed upon manner, through voluntary
acquisition of the land from the owners. However, there are
1. For a comprehensive review of the role of eminent domain in American
property jurisprudence, see William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972); Laura Mansnerus, Public Use, Private Use,
and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409
(1983). See also RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 35–37 (1985).
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situations where such a voluntary acquisition is not possible. One of
the main obstacles governments face in providing for society’s needs
is market imperfection. Market failures, such as holdouts and free
riders, may prevent the government from purchasing land voluntarily
and may therefore threaten government’s ability to meet society’s
needs. 2 The government’s power to forcefully take private property,
therefore, is considered an essential instrument that allows it to
realize its underlying purpose— fulfilling society’s needs. 3
However, while this power can be useful to the government in
overcoming obstacles that may prevent it from meeting the needs of
its citizens, its use raises three primary concerns. First is corruption:
the government might improperly use its power to take private
property even when there is no justification for doing so. Second is
fairness: government taking of private property raises concerns about
the fair allocation of burdens among society members, particularly
where one property owner is forced to sacrifice for the benefit of the
community. This concern raises questions about the scope and scale
of the obligations that owners have toward their communities 4 and
2. The most prominent market failure discussed in the literature, known as the
“holdout” problem, relates to the transactional costs that arise when multiple land
parcels are required to facilitate the implementation of the public need; most agree
that one party prevents or delays this implementation by delaying the voluntary
purchase. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 509, 606 (1986); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40–41 (2d
ed. 1970); Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 473 (1976); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of
Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006) (“The primary objection to
substantive limits on the eminent domain power is that holdouts may impede socially
beneficial projects.”); cf. Bruce L. Benson, The Mythology of Holdout as a
Justification for Eminent Domain and Public Provision of Roads, 10 INDEP. REV. 165,
166 (2005). While market failures are considered the prominent justification for
government takings power, both the literature and case law suggest another
justification based on distributive justice and the government’s commitment to ensure
equality. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding the
constitutionality of land-reform measures that target oligopolistic owners and
redistribute some of their land titles as falling within the takings clause); see generally
Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999); Jeffrey
M. Gaba, Taking Justice and Fairness Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings
Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1981) (quoting Justice Cooley in People ex rel. Detroit Howell
R.R. Co. v. Salem Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 480–82 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1870), who said,
“the most important consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of
accomplishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable . . . ”) overruled by
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2004) (overruling
Poletown Neighborhood Council on other grounds).
4. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of
Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, The
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the fairness of forced reallocation of burdens when the beneficiaries
include other individuals. Third is inefficiency: the government’s use
of its takings power — which, because of its coercive nature, operates
outside the boundaries of the free market — raises concerns about
potential inefficiencies involved in realizing the public need.
Specifically, use of the takings power raises two fundamental
questions: Whether the government will be able to internalize the
social costs involved in realizing the public project for which the
property was taken, and how the investment policy of current and
prospective landowners will be affected. 5
These concerns shape current takings law, which aims to address
each of these issues by incorporating three safeguards. First is a
procedural safeguard, manifested by the government’s duty to
provide owners with due process to reduce concerns of governmental
misuse of takings power. 6 Second is the fairness safeguard, which
requires that the taken property be used only for public needs; this
sketches the boundaries of owners’ obligations to their communities
and prevents governments from using their takings power to
improperly redistribute property among private individuals. Third is
the efficiency safeguard, actualized by the duty of the government to
compensate owners for the taken property, 7 which prevents
ineffectiveness in the execution of the public project for which the
property was taken. These three safeguards provide triangular
protection against the three inherent concerns that arise from the
government’s takings power. However, what happens when none of
these safeguards can be fully realized? Can governments use their
takings power to confiscate private property even when doing so
might compromise due process, the publicness of the use, or just
compensation?
If so, under what circumstances can such a
compromise be legitimized?
This Article contends that takings law cannot be blind to imperfect
circumstances. Emergencies, crises, and budgetary limitations are an
undeniable part of everyday reality, and ignoring them may result in
situations where the underlying good that governmental taking can
promote is overshadowed by the harms that arise in such imperfect

Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2008);
Hanoch Dagan, Property and the Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 84 (2006);
Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles,
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 17–22.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 24–28.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 35–36.
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circumstances. By the same token, insisting on the full realization of
all the safeguards implicated by takings law, regardless of the
circumstances, may harm the government’s ability to make use of its
power, leaving society’s needs unfulfilled.
This Article demonstrates that, although each of the safeguards in
takings law provides protection against a particular concern, each one
simultaneously provides ancillary protection against the other two
concerns as well. In this sense, each of the three safeguards
incorporated in takings law protects against each of the three
concerns inherent in confiscation of private property.
These
overlapping protections provided by the safeguards allow for an
interplay between them. Governments can ease the implementation
of one safeguard as circumstances require, while still maintaining an
adequate level of protection against all three inherent concerns. This
interplay between takings law’s safeguards reduces the need for all
safeguards to be fully implemented in every circumstance — even
when one of the safeguards is not fully implemented, it is still possible
to provide adequate protection against the concern it was originally
intended to assuage. Indeed, since each safeguard protects against all
three of takings law’s inherent concerns to some degree, even if the
government compromises on one of the safeguards, the interplay
identified here will still provide proper protection against all three
concerns. Another important aspect of the interplay model is the
application of safeguards in a nonbinary manner, such that each of
the safeguards can be applied in several different ways. At bottom,
by recognizing and implementing this flexible interplay model,
decision-makers, legislators, and courts have a predictable framework
for adjusting takings law to imperfect circumstances.
With these insights in mind, any compromise on takings law’s
safeguards must be contingent on two conditions. First, only one of
the safeguards can be compromised at any given time, and even then,
the safeguard cannot be completely relinquished. This means that
even though imperfect circumstances may require a softening in the
realization of one of the safeguards, they can never serve as an excuse
for governments to ignore or waive that safeguard completely.
Second, when one of the safeguards must be compromised, and so is
only partially realized, the other two safeguards should be
implemented in a stricter manner.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses in detail the
concerns inherent to governments’ use of takings power:
governmental abuse of its power, unfair distribution of burdens, and
inefficiency in the project’s implementation. Part II demonstrates
how takings law incorporated three safeguards to address these
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concerns. The procedural safeguard (through the requirement of due
process) is meant to mitigate against governmental corruption; the
fairness safeguard, by requiring that expropriation be done only for
public use, is meant to ensure a fair distribution of burdens; and the
efficiency safeguard, through the compensation requirement, aims to
ensure economic efficiency in the exchange being facilitated. Part III
identifies the interplay between takings law’s three safeguards, which
is based in the recognition that although each of them provides
primary protection against a certain concern, they all provide
secondary protection from the other two as well. This Part continues
to discuss the implications of the interplay model, which provides a
platform for legitimate takings even in imperfect circumstances. Part
IV shifts the proposed interplay model from theory to practice and
provides an explanation of takings jurisprudence that seemingly
stands at odds with current takings law. This allows a rethinking of
old conventions in takings jurisprudence.
I.

THE POWER TO TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY: IMPORTANCE AND
INHERENT CONCERNS

Many governments possess the power to acquire property from
unwilling property owners to further the general welfare. This power,
which interferes with owners’ property rights, is legitimate in most
Western legal jurisdictions and is often used by governments to
overcome market failures that prevent the efficient implementation
of public needs. 8 Compulsory acquisition of private property,
however, also gives rise to concerns that are inherent in governmental
actions that take a coercive form. Three such inherent concerns have
shaped current takings law: governmental abuse of power, unfair
distribution of burdens, and inefficiency.
One of the fundamental premises underlying governmental
expropriation powers is that a government will likely encounter
difficulties when attempting to provide various social needs to its
citizens. Some of the most significant challenges include, for example,

8. On the power of eminent domain in the American legal system, see JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 895–996 (2006). On the history of eminent domain
in the United States, or its equivalents in other countries, see NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 1.1 (2006). For a comprehensive review of how constitutions in different
jurisdictions address expropriation of private property, see A.J. VAN DER WALT,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999). For a
comparison of constitutional treatment of expropriation in the United States,
Germany, and South Africa, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE
OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE (2006).
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the supply of public goods, or overcoming inherent market failures
such as holdouts and free riders. 9 However important the takings
power is to governments, it must be carefully exercised and executed
— indeed, governments’ ability to expropriate private property raises
a familiar concern: that corruption, greed, or inattentiveness might
lead to misuse of this power. 10 That is, authorities who can legally
take property through coercion might use this power when the
property ought to have been bought in the free market. 11 If
unchecked, the governmental takings power might be abused to
convey property to those close to power or to achieve hidden goals. 12
Compulsory acquisition of property rights by governmental
authorities raises additional concerns relating to fairness. 13 While the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution allows the
federal government to take private property in order to provide for
public needs, exercising this power raises two distributive

9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82 (1986); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The
Holdout Problem, Urban Sprawl, and Eminent Domain, 16 J. HOUSING ECON. 309
(2007).
10. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509, 605 (1986) (“Concerns about abuse of power are potentially far
more important in the context of takings than in most other transition contexts
precisely because takings often single out individuals or groups . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., Michael A. Lang, Taking Back Eminent Domain: Using Heightened
Scrutiny to Stop Eminent Domain Abuse, 39 IND. L. REV. 449, 453–54, 467 (2006);
Jeffrey W. Scott, Public Use and Private Profit: When Should Heightened Scrutiny
Be Applied to “Public-Private” Takings?, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 466, 473–74 (2003).
12. See, e.g., DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN IN
THE
POST-KELO
WORLD
7
(2006),
http://castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/floodgates-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL8Q-738X] (documenting over 5,000 actual or threatened cases of
private takings between June 2005 and June 2006); DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER,
PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ED_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RW5-WHVN] (documenting over 10,000 actual or threatened
cases of private takings from 1998 through 2002 and demonstrating how takings often
abuse poor neighborhoods and elderly residents); see generally Martin E. Gold &
Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight in Eminent Domain, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1119 (2010).
13. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”).
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difficulties. 14 First, should a private owner bear the burden of
providing for the needs of society? Second, what is the scope and
scale of the public need that justifies using takings power? Both
questions relate to the notion of fairness in the exercise of power by
government in different ways. As Justice Chase outlined as early as
1798 in Calder v. Bull, neither reason nor justice may justify the
government’s ability to take property from “A” and give it to “B.” 15
Over two hundred years later, courts and scholars still struggle with
questions of fairness relating to coercive state powers and the taking
of private property. 16
The final concern is that governments exercising their compulsory
acquisition powers might ignore efficiency considerations as they
execute the public project. 17 This criticism mainly stems from the fact
that compulsory takings circumvent free market mechanisms,
highlighting the lack of efficient economic frameworks for
government expropriation. The government’s actions will ultimately
be inefficient if it disregards the inherent value of the property when
it calculates the economic efficiency of fulfilling the public need.18
Prevalent in the commentary on this topic is the assertion that the
government might be caught up in a “fiscal illusion” that will cause it
to disregard the value of the taken property when calculating the
project’s costs. 19 According to the “fiscal illusion” argument,
governments ignore costs that are not reflected in the budget of the

14. Id.; see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV.
741, 742–43 (1999).
15. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387–88 (1798).
16. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Charles E.
Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for
Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2005);
Eric L. Silkwood, The Downlow on Kelo: How an Expansive Interpretation of the
Public Use Clause Has Opened the Floodgates for Eminent Domain Abuse, 109 W.
VA. L. REV. 493 (2006); ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW
LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015).
17. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in
the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1001 (1999) (“[T]o relieve the
government of any obligation to pay is to forgo an opportunity to test whether the
benefits of a government program are truly worth its costs, an important matter when
the benefit-cost call is a close one.”).
18. Id.
19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (4th ed. 1992) (“A
straight forward economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation is
that it prevents the government from overusing the taking power.”).
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project itself. 20 Government officials who suffer from the fiscal
illusion will tend to engage in inefficient exercises of eminent domain,
since they only see the public benefit of takings while ignoring the
cost to the property owners. 21 On the other side of the takings
equation, property owners’ investment policies might be distorted
because of concerns about future governmental takings of their land,
leading to an inefficient process. 22
These three concerns are inherent in government’s compulsory
acquisition of property. They stem from the forced nature of the
government’s action and its execution outside the margins of the free
market, as well as from the intrinsic characteristics of governmental
action and the relationship between the government and those close
to power. 23 In most Western jurisdictions, governmental takings law
has aimed to address these inherent concerns by incorporating three
legal safeguards against coercive acquisition.
II. THE TRIANGULAR SAFEGUARD MECHANISM OF TAKINGS LAW
To address the three inherent concerns of governmental
expropriation of private property, takings law incorporates three
safeguards. The first safeguard — termed the “procedural safeguard”
— binds takings power with the demands of due process. The Fifth
Amendment specifically states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 24 Taken
together with the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law[,]” 25 the Constitution affords property owners the
right to due process in both federal and state government
confiscations. 26 The scope and scale of these procedures, however,

20. See Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government
Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation
Requirement on Eminent-Domain Exercises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 438 (2016).
21. See id.
22. See Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation
Be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71, 72 (1984).
23. On the concern that governments will execute coercive acquisition to the
benefit of those close to power, see, e.g., Heller & Krier, supra note 17, at 1001 (“If
compensation were not required, politicians would be inclined to support
government projects that benefit the privileged at the expense of the vulnerable.”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
26. See D. Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280,
1282–83 (2010).
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vary from state to state. 27 Governments’ power to take private
property is conditioned upon providing owners with due process to
reduce the concern of governmental abuse. 28 When owners are
informed about expected expropriation and receive an opportunity to
express their protest, the likelihood of state abuse of power decreases.
Another safeguard incorporated into takings law, the “fairness
safeguard,” refers to the requirement that expropriated property be
taken only for public use. The demand that the governmental taking
be for a “public use,” 29 “public need,” or “public interest” has been
implemented in most Western governmental takings laws. 30 In
whatever scope or scale, this requirement clarifies that government
may forcibly take private property only when necessary to fulfill the
individual’s obligations to society as a whole. Indeed, neither reason
nor justice can justify unfairly taking one’s property and giving it to
another. 31 It is the owners’ social obligation that legitimizes the
government’s power to interfere with private property in the first
place. 32 There will inevitably be varying interpretations of what
constitutes a “public” government objective, but there remains no
dispute that the justification for takings must begin with the
individual’s obligation to society. 33 Therefore, the “publicness” of the
goal for taking one’s property is intended to protect against a

27. For a comprehensive summary of due process in takings proceeding in
different states, see id. at 1321–27. D. Zachary Hudson demonstrates how both state
and federal courts embrace the importance of due process as a precondition to
governmental intervention in one’s property rights. Id.
28. For the argument that due process protects against governmental abuse of
power, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”);
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the
Court Taken the Substance out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV.
313 (1991). For the implications of this argument in takings law, see Hudson, supra
note 26, at 1287.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW ART. 14.3], translation
at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/basic-law-470510
[https://perma.cc/9FSH-K3DF] (“public interest”); Land (Acquisition for Public
Purposes) Ordinance §§ 2, 7 (1943) (“acquisition for public needs”); S. AFR. CONST. §
25, 1996 (“public purpose or public interest”).
31. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387–88 (1798).
32. Alexander, supra note 4, at 776 (“Eminent domain is a legal and political
process for determining just what that responsibility is. At its most general level, the
power of eminent domain represents our collective judgment that the state is justified
in demanding of us, as members of the political and social community that nurtures
us as flourishing individuals, under certain conditions, the sacrifice of title to our land
in exchange for just compensation, measured at fair market value.”).
33. Id. at 776–77.
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governmental taking that exceeds the individual’s obligations to
society. 34 This requirement sketches the bounds of what should and
should not be considered a “fair” and legitimate burden imposed on
individual property owners. The “fairness safeguard,” therefore, is
designed primarily to prevent the government from taking private
property in a manner that unfairly distributes burdens in society.
The third safeguard incorporated in takings law in most Western
jurisdictions is mandatory compensation. 35 The requirement that
owners be compensated when their property is coercively taken is
mainly intended to ensure economically efficient execution of the
purpose for which the land was expropriated. 36 However, because
governmental taking is compulsory, it operates outside the
boundaries of the free market. This disconnect gives rise to a concern
about inefficiency in the implementing procedures of the public
project, which is expressed in two ways. First, in the form of a fiscal
illusion: government officials might engage in inefficient exercises of
eminent domain, because they are likely to see only the public benefit
of takings while ignoring the cost to the owners. 37 If not required to
compensate owners, the expropriating authorities might disregard the
property’s value when calculating the overall costs of the acquisition
itself. 38 This fiscal illusion disrupts the economic calculus by which
the government executes the taking and is therefore likely to damage
its efficiency. 39 Second, the compensation, or lack thereof, also
affects property owners’ attitudes towards investing in their land.40
Lack of compensation or partial compensation may lead owners to
adopt an under-investment policy to avoid financial loss in case their

34. Id. at 777 (“The fact that the power of eminent domain is collective creates an
obvious risk of abuse. The political community is justified in demanding this
entitlement sacrifice only to the extent that the demand represents a bona fide
determination of what is in the community’s best interests by a legitimate
representative expression of that community.”).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1173 (1967).
37. See Levine-Schnur & Parchomovsky, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
38. THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 141 (1997); POSNER, supra note
19, at 58 (“The simplest economic explanation for the requirement of just
compensation is that it prevents the government from overusing the taking power.”);
John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783,
794 (2006); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1297 (1985).
39. See Heller & Krier, supra note 17, at 1001.
40. See Blume et al., supra note 22, at 71, 72, 82.
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property is taken by the government. 41 If the government elects to
use a non-compensation or a partial compensation policy, owners
may decide not to develop or invest in their property because they
fear that if their property is expropriated, they will not be fully
compensated for these investments. Contrarily, full compensation
may lead owners to adopt an attitude of over-investment that will
burden the whole of society to finance the owners’ idiosyncratic
investments. 42 That is to say, if government is too quick to
compensate, owners may disregard economically desired level of
investment as they assume they would be compensated fully for any
investment in the property. These impacts on owners’ investment
choices have a bearing on aggregate welfare. They also affect the
efficiency of governmental takings, as they skew the price tag that the
government will have to pay to accomplish the public need. 43
These three safeguards, all incorporated in American takings law
as well as in most other Western jurisdictions’ expropriation laws,
provide threefold protection against the concerns that are inherent in
compulsory taking of property. It is important to recognize, however,
that each safeguard is implemented on a continuum that moves from
a low measure of protection to a high one.
The “procedural safeguard,” for example, calls for transparent and
participatory procedures that give landowners a platform for
expression and hearing rights. To achieve this result, various
jurisdictions demand the existence of numerous and diverse
procedures, such as mandatory notification to owners before the
taking begins, 44 first offer to and negotiation with owners, 45

41. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973) (“If a person

feels that the market undervalues his damage, he may be unusually sensitive and the
best cost avoider of the losses resulting from that hypersensitivity.”). See also Blume
et al., supra note 22 at 71, 72, 82 (discussing the effect of compensation rules on
owners’ future investment decisions).
42. See Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium
in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 622 (2013) (discussing the implications
of the compensation on the owner’s investment policy); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 882 (2007)
(arguing that full compensation creates “a moral hazard problem” since “full
recompense distorts property owners’ incentives”).
43. See Ellickson, supra note 41, at 736.
44. For a comprehensive review of due process procedures in different states in
the United States, see Hudson, supra note 26, at 1322–27. For a comprehensive
review about the procedural requirement in expropriation proceedings in Europe,
see EXPROPRIATION LAW IN EUROPE (Jacques Sluysmans et al. eds., 2015).
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 18-1A-22, 18-1A-24, 18-1A-74 (LexisNexis 2007);
CODE
ANN.
IDAHO
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mandatory hearings and the provision of information, 46 and
transparent procedures that are subject to public and judicial
review. 47 But procedural protection in eminent domain proceedings
are not standardized — each state may require some procedures and
not require others. 48 These differences among jurisdictions regarding
the scope and scale of procedural requirements display a continuum
of implementation, from the bare minimum requirements to heavy
and elaborate procedural protections.
The “fairness safeguard” is implemented on a spectrum with
respect to the “publicness” of the project for which the property is
taken. At one end are so-called “hard” public objectives — those that
directly relate to providing essential services such as transportation,
health, and education. 49 At the other end are “soft” public objectives
achieved by private entities, which only indirectly lead to increased
public welfare. A notable example of a “soft” public objective is seen
in Kelo v. City of New London, a case decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 2005. 50 In Kelo, the City of New London,
Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private
property to sell to private developers. 51 The City’s justification was
that developing the land would create jobs and increase tax
revenues. 52 The Court concluded that the City’s compulsory taking,
in order to sell the property for private development, qualified as a
“public use” within the meaning of the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 53 While this ruling provoked both legal and public

§§ 7-706 to 7-710 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-24-1-3 to 32-24-1-16
(LexisNexis 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 6B.1 to 6B.3 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 70-30-111, 70-30-202 (West 2009) and N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-15-06.1 (West
2017).
46. See Hudson, supra note 26, at 1322–27.
47. Id.
48. For example, while both Alabama and Kansas provide owners with due
process in takings procedures, Alabama law requires prior offer and negotiation, full
pre-condemnation hearing, and notice, while Kansas law requires full precondemnation hearing and notice but does not condition the taking on the authority’s
prior offer and negotiation with owners. See ALA. CODE §§ 18-1A-22, 18-1A-24, 181A-74 (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-501 to 26-517 (2000).
49. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)
(confiscation for military base); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700,
707–08 (1923) (confiscation for highways).
50. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
51. Id. at 473–74.
52. Id. at 469–70.
53. The case will be explained in depth infra Section IV.A.
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backlash, 54 the holding sketches how wide the boundaries are for
“publicness” in expropriations.
The “efficiency safeguard” exists on a continuum relating to the
rate of compensation that should be paid — or, put another way, the
type of remedy that should be afforded — to owners. In general,
American takings law, like most Western jurisdictions, embraces a
compensation standard based on the fair market value of the taken
property. 55 Nevertheless, some states supplemented this universal
standard with compensation for loss of goodwill or with relocation
assistance. Additionally, after the Kelo ruling some states amended
their takings law, requiring authorities to pay up to 200% of the taken
property’s market value in takings meant for economic
development. 56 Therefore, while the fair market value of the
property serves as the universal compensation standard, it might be
amended to provide additional compensation.
In summary, the three safeguards incorporated in governmental
takings law are intended to protect against the realization of the
concerns surrounding coercive government power and its
accompanying implications. These safeguards attempt to ensure that
the government’s power to forcibly take private property is exercised
in a proper, fair, and efficient way. Nevertheless, as discussed below,
setting a high bar for the implementation of all the protective
mechanisms simultaneously might, at times, defeat the basic and
much-needed purpose of takings power itself.

54. For a review of the post-Kelo political and public backlash, see generally
SOMIN, supra note 16, at 135–64.
55. This rule is subject to two narrow and seldom applied exceptions: fair market
value does not apply where it would be too difficult to measure or where manifest
injustice would result. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121,
123 (1950). For a comprehensive review of the American ruling on this issue, see
generally Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation
for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2004).
56. In response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo, several
states made changes to their expropriation laws to determine the rate of
compensation at above market value. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. X, §2 (amended
2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-127(b)(6)(D), 8-193(b)(1) (2010); S.B. 167, 2007 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (requiring payment of “not less than 125 percent of that
property’s fair market value, in addition to any other reimbursement allowed by
law”). See also H.B. 1010, Leg. (Ind. 2006) (requiring payment of compensation when
the condemned property is the person’s primary residence at a rate equal to 150
percent of fair market value); S.B. 323, Leg. (Kan. 2006) (increasing the level of
compensation to landowners whose property is condemned for private economic
development purposes to 200 percent of the average appraised value of the
property).

144

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

III. IMPERFECT TAKINGS: A NON-UTOPIAN MODEL FOR TAKINGS
LAW
Takings law incorporates three safeguards to protect against the
concerns inherent in governments’ takings powers, but the full
execution of these protections can often be challenging. Consider, for
example, times of crisis. In cases of emergency, authorities might
need to take certain lands without abiding by all the procedures that
apply to compulsory acquisition under normal conditions. In other
cases, private entities might have to be involved to fully realize the
purpose of the governmental taking. Or the government might need
to supply services and products to society but have insufficient
resources to fully compensate owners for the value of the taken
property. These “imperfect” situations complicate the equation: Is
expropriation of private property justified only with complete
implementation of the three safeguards? Or are there situations
where implementation can be relaxed?
This Part of the Article contends that the original rationale for
incorporating the three safeguards into takings law also justifies, in
certain cases, easing their implementation. As mentioned above,
underlying the three safeguards is the desire to ensure that
expropriation of private property is done ethically, fairly, and with
economic efficiency. 57 However, it is important not to lose sight of
the fact that the overarching purpose of takings law is to enable the
government to provide essential needs to its citizens. Setting too high
a bar that demands strict and rigid implementation of the three
safeguards will likely hinder the government’s ability to accomplish
that purpose and weaken a fundamental assumption that underlies
the incorporation of the safeguards in expropriation law: that there
should be a balance between the government’s duty to meet society’s
essential needs and the execution of this duty in a suitable way.
To achieve this balance, governments must understand the specific
protections that each of the safeguards provides. As mentioned
above, each safeguard protects directly against one of the three
concerns inherent in the governmental takings power. But each
safeguard reaches beyond this reason for being; that is, each also
protects, in differing degrees, against the evils that the other two
safeguards are intended to mitigate.
The procedural safeguard protects primarily against corruption —
governmental abuse of its power to take private property. Indeed,

57. See supra Part II.
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the implementation of regulated and transparent takings procedures,
such as the duty to consult with experts or to hold mandatory
hearings, reduces the possibility that governments will expropriate
private property without restraint. 58 But these procedures also
protect against unfair execution of governmental expropriation.
Well-known, transparent, and participatory public procedures ensure
that authorities maintain a balance between providing societal needs
through compulsory acquisition while considering the burdens placed
on individuals losing property. The likelihood that burdens will be
imposed in an unbalanced manner decreases when authorities have to
justify their takings, and, no less importantly, when these takings are
overt and exposed to public or legal review. Adherence to such
procedures also makes inefficiency in executing governmental takings
less likely. Through structured takings procedures, the government
and the property owner can reveal to each other the costs that will be
involved in executing the taking. As mentioned previously, the main
inefficiency concern in governmental takings is that authorities may
fall prey to a “fiscal illusion,” where they exercise their coercive
takings power without accounting for the value of the property. 59
Proceedings involving landowners, especially ones in which owners
have the right to present claims that include property values before
the authority itself, significantly mitigate the concern that the
authorities will ignore or overlook this value. 60 When conceptualized
this way, the procedural safeguard offers protection against all three
concerns inherent in takings law — most directly against government
abuse, and secondarily against unfair or inefficient processes.
A similar argument can be made about the fairness safeguard,
which protects principally against the risk of inequity in coercive
takings. 61 The primary concern is that the government might exercise
its duty to provide for society’s needs in an unbalanced manner. This
improperly places societal burdens disproportionately on the
shoulders of private property owners. The public use requirement
protects against this possibility because it clarifies the boundaries of
the sacrifice demanded from individual citizens. 62 But a more indepth examination reveals that this requirement also provides
protection against governmental corruption and economic

58. Hudson, supra note 26, at 1287.
59. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
60. Shai Stern, Remodeling Just Compensation: Applying Restorative Justice to
Takings Law Doctrine, 30 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 413, 440 (2017).
61. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
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inefficiency. The requirement that government takings be used only
for public needs mitigates the possibility of abuse of power by limiting
the purposes for which government can properly expropriate private
property. The “publicness” requirement also addresses the concern
of inefficiency in governmental takings, because the government
justifies its power to take private property by latching onto a market
failure — without government intervention, the reasoning goes, the
public need will not be met. 63 But in cases where the aimed project
involves private commodities rather than public ones, there is no
economic justification for the government to exercise its compulsory
takings power. Like the procedural safeguard, ensuring fairness in
takings protects principally against inequitable distribution of
burdens, but also provides secondary guarantees against corruption
and inefficiency.
Finally, the efficiency safeguard is primarily intended to ensure the
economic efficiency of the governmental expropriation by requiring
just compensation for compulsory taking. But this safeguard also
reduces the risks of governmental corruption and unfairness. The
requirement that owners receive compensation for taken property
reduces the likelihood of governmental corruption because it attaches
a price tag to the taking. If the taking authority is exempt from
granting compensation to the owners, it has an incentive to take
private property — governmental gain at no cost. This perverse
incentive might motivate authorities to take private property even
when the taking does not provide for society’s needs, and instead only
feeds the interests of those close to power. Attaching a cost to
governmental takings reduces authorities’ incentive to exploit their
power for improper purposes, since they will have to pay owners for
the taken property. 64 The compensation requirement also reduces
unfairness in the governmental takings process, mainly with respect to
the concern that an unbalanced burden will be imposed on property
owners’ shoulders for the benefit of society at large.
The
compensation requirement accounts for at least part of the property’s
worth. 65 In this sense, compensation acts as a counterweight to the
loss incurred by owners, thereby reducing the concern that they will

63. See Garnett, supra note 2, at 139.
64. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings
Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2010) (“Mandatory compensation
dramatically reduces the profits politicians can derive from takings. As a result, it
takes away much of the incentive to use the takings power to private ends and
refocuses their attention on the public good.”).
65. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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have to bear the entire burden of providing for society’s needs.
Demanding just compensation thus not only ensures efficient takings
procedures, but also acts to dissuade corrupt government practices
and to provide some fairness into an otherwise unfair transaction.
The safeguards thus operate through an interplay: in “perfect”
conditions, each safeguard provides protection against all three risks
inherent in governmental expropriation of private property, primarily
against one and partially against the other two. This interplay is
particularly important for “imperfect” circumstances, when the
government is justified in reducing the implementation of one of the
safeguards because all three safeguards overlap in protections. As
implementation of one safeguard is lowered, the concern that
safeguard is primarily intended to alleviate can still be addressed by
heightening implementation of the other two safeguards. This
broadens the circumstances in which government can properly
exercise its eminent domain powers. Even in imperfect circumstances
when one of the protective mechanisms must be partially weakened,
takings can remain legitimate as long as the other two protective
mechanisms are fully implemented.
Think, for example, of a situation in which the state is required to
expropriate private property in response to an urgent security
threat. 66 In such a situation, it is difficult to follow regulated and
transparent procedures, and trying to do so might endanger the public
by hindering the government’s taking. Can property owners be
satisfied with the existence of only the other two safeguards — public
need (fairness) and compensation (efficiency) — in order to validate
the expropriation? Or, consider a scenario in which the authority’s
financial situation does not enable it to purchase property needed to
fulfill an essential societal need at full market price. Does the
government’s poverty negate the taking’s legitimacy? Finally,
imagine a situation in which the government seeks to advance a goal
with the help of private entities, or one where the purpose for which
the government seeks to expropriate property is achievable only
when private entities profit financially from the governmental taking.
Would involvement of such private parties (and possibly their
profiting from the taking) undercut the taking’s legitimacy?
These scenarios are not hypothetical. They have occurred in a
considerable number of governmental takings executed in the United

66. See Brian A. Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 398 (2015)
(reviewing cases of emergency takings for security reasons).
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States and around the world. 67 This Article, therefore, calls for
rejecting the rigid, unrealistic framework of implementing all
protections against compulsory government takings and
acknowledges that the interplay among the three safeguards remedies
the flaws that arise when any one of them is suppressed. This
acknowledgment depends upon two necessary conditions: first, that
all three safeguards remain in effect, however partially; second, that
lowering the bar for the implementation of one of the safeguards
demands stricter adherence to the other two safeguards.
The first condition suggests that none of the safeguards can be
quashed entirely because each safeguard protects directly against one
of the concerns inherent in government’s power to take private
property. As the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Chevron: “If
a government action is found to be impermissible — for instance
because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary
as to violate due process — that is the end of the inquiry. No amount
of compensation can authorize such action.” 68
The second condition recognizes the interplay amongst the
safeguards, as well as the cumulative protection they provide against
the three inherent concerns. This interplay provides a platform to
address imperfect circumstances in which governments aim to provide
for society’s needs but lack time or funding. The application of the
interplay model to imperfect circumstances is characteristic of many
expropriations in the United States and worldwide and justifies
governments’ use of takings power despite one of the aforementioned
deficiencies. The interplay model also permits us to rethink some old,
outdated conventions that shaped current takings law.
IV. RETHINKING OLD CONVENTIONS
The interplay model proposed in this Article aims to provide a
normative justification for imperfect takings, when authorities must
execute their takings power despite only partially employing one of
the three safeguards. This reimagining of compulsory government
takings provides an explanation of, and a justification for,
governmental takings that seem at odds with current takings law, as

67. Id. at 397–401. See also Carol L. Zeiner, Establishing a Leasehold Through
Eminent Domain: A Slippery Slope Made More Treacherous by Kelo, 56 CATH. U. L.

REV. 503, 523 (2007) (discussing governments’ need to compromise process to
address disasters); Hudson, supra note 26, at 1310.
68. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
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well as an opportunity to rethink old conventions in takings
jurisprudence.
A. Kelo Reconstructed: Compromising Public Use
Much has been written about the ongoing dismantling of the
“publicness” standard required by the “public use” of takings, and on
the compromising treatment that courts give to expropriation of
private property for purposes that are not truly public. 69 The most
prominent example of this is found in Kelo. 70 There, the Supreme
Court found that the “economic development” planned by the City of
New London was a legitimate public use; that is, it was a project that
met the constitutional requirement that takings ought not be carried
out unless for public use. 71 In Kelo, New London confiscated private
property owned by Suzette Kelo and her neighbors in order to
establish a research facility for the pharmaceutical company Pfizer. 72
The private status of the entity expected to use the taken property
was not debated; rather, the City argued that the large research center
would create new jobs, increase tax and other city revenues, and
revitalize a depressed urban area. 73 These benefits to the city and its
residents, the City maintained, satisfied the public use requirement.
Kelo and her neighbors protested that these marginal benefits to
society could not disguise the fact that the City took private property
from a group of private owners and gave it to a private company.74
The Supreme Court sided with New London. In a 5-4 decision, the
Court held that the general benefits a community might enjoy from
economic growth qualify private redevelopment plans as a
permissible “public use” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 75
Scholars and jurists regard Kelo as a challenge to the public use
requirement. Some have argued that legitimizing expropriations of
private property for economic development will inevitably harm
69. See, e.g., Philip Nichols Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615 (1940); Lawrence Burger, Public Use Requirement in
Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1977); Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent
Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1931 (2007); Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934
(2003).
70. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
71. Id. at 489–90.
72. Id. at 473–75.
73. Id. at 472.
74. Id. at 477–78.
75. Id. at 489–90.
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vulnerable private property owners, because it provides another
excuse for authorities to expropriate property in blighted
neighborhoods. 76 Various states across the United States amended
their expropriation laws in response to the Court’s rulings in Kelo,
mostly by increasing the amount of compensation that private
property owners would be entitled to in the event of government
taking for purposes of economic development. 77 But is the public and
legal backlash against Kelo justified? Was the Kelo Court right to
legitimize the taking?
To answer this question, we must return to the essence of the
public use requirement: to provide a method for government to fairly
provide for societal needs. 78 This was incorporated into the Takings
Clause primarily to mark the boundaries of fairness when government
exercises coercive power to take private property. 79 The inclusion of
constitutional safeguards demonstrates that using coercive taking to
redistribute property between two private individuals is
inappropriate, 80 but its use to satisfy the needs of society as a whole
might be acceptable. To determine whether a compulsory taking
complies with the public use requirement, one needs to check
whether it fulfills a societal need that the government is expected to
provide.
The Court had two options in Kelo: it could define “public use” as
including only those essential social needs that will directly serve the
public as a whole, or it could recognize “public use” more broadly to
include projects that provide either essential or marginal societal
benefits. The former of these interpretations relies on a binary
conception of public use, one in which any public project can be
76. See, e.g., id. at 521–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Allowing the government to
take property solely for a public purpose is bad enough, but extending the concept of
public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these
losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not
only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but
are also the least politically powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive
judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect ‘discreet and insular
minorities,’ surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups
and individuals the Public Use Clause protects.”); see also Charles E. Cohen,
Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 546 (2006);
Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38
URB. LAW. 201, 205–06 (2006).
77. As mentioned, several states changed their expropriation laws in reaction to
Kelo. See supra note 56.
78. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
80. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
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characterized as only one of two alternatives — it is either for an
essential “public use,” or it is not. The latter, in contrast, recognizes a
linear approach — a continuum that stretches between the most
essential public uses on one end, to the projects whose contribution to
the public is marginal on the other. Services on the essential end
include security, safety, public health, education, and transportation;
on the marginal end are projects that give expropriated property to
private entities, and the public enjoys the secondary benefits of these
private investments. In a series of rulings, the Court rejected the
binary conception and chose to apply the linear one. 81 Justice
Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Kelo, describes the Court’s
choice of the linear approach as “the latest in a string of our cases
construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the
slightest nod to its original meaning.” 82 According to Justice Thomas,
therefore, the Court’s choosing to apply the linear approach to public
use coincides with nullifying the public use requirement altogether.
The interplay model proposed in this Article offers a different
perspective on the Court’s adoption of the linear approach, which
results in a more sympathetic conceptualization of the Kelo ruling.
Under the interplay model, the Court’s decision to apply the linear
approach does not mean that the distinctions between different levels
of “publicness” in various projects must be rejected. On the contrary,
adopting the linear approach sharpens the distinction between
projects with a high level of publicness, such that their
implementation is essential to the public as a whole, and projects that
contribute primarily to private entities and provide only marginal
benefits to the public. It would be incorrect to view the Court’s ruling
in Kelo as stating that projects with only marginal public benefit are
no different from those directly supplying vital public needs. The
correct interpretation of the Court’s legitimizing marginal benefit
projects as “public use” is that there is a degree of publicness to each
project, which varies depending on particular instances and
conditions. The interplay model functions in precisely this manner: as
long as the government project falls somewhere on the continuum,
such that the government can point to a public benefit that would
result from implementing the project, it is acceptable to compromise
on the extent of the project’s publicness as long as the government
ensures strict implementation of the other two safeguards. Indeed, to

81. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
82. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

152

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

the extent that the other two safeguards — in this case the procedural
and efficiency safeguards — will be performed with heightened
urgency, we might legitimize governmental taking of private property
even if the project for which the property is taken compromises the
public use requirement.
To illustrate the interplay model, let us reconsider Kelo. The
Court compromised the public use requirement in government
takings when it determined that “economic development” of a
blighted area by a private entity constituted a legitimate public use.83
Certainly, this is not equivalent to circumstances in which land is
expropriated for essential public needs. At the same time, it is worth
recognizing that the project for which the land was expropriated in
Kelo still retained a degree of publicness, however limited. The
public benefits of establishing a research and development center in
New London were an improvement, for example, on the poor
employment conditions in the city. Therefore, while economic
development was not primarily a public use in the strict
understanding of the term, it nevertheless remained on the continuum
such that the public use requirement was not fully compromised.
According to the interplay model, compromising on one of the
three safeguards does not coincide with denying the legitimacy of the
expropriation altogether. Rather, this compromise heightens a
government’s duty to ensure the implementation of the other two
safeguards. In the case of Suzette Kelo, then, the proper question to
ask is whether fair procedure and proper compensation were strictly
met. In his book Little Pink House, Jeff Benedict follows Suzette
Kelo’s journey, from her purchasing the house that was eventually
taken by New London, to her travels across the United States after
the Supreme Court’s decision. 84 Benedict reveals the long process
New London required to execute the taking, which included
negotiations, hearings, and notifications. 85 Although neither these
procedures nor their outcomes satisfied Suzette Kelo and her
neighbors, it should be recognized that they fulfilled New London’s
due process requirements.
83. Id. at 479.
84. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF
DEFIANCE AND COURAGE (2009).
85. To get a sense of the level of owners’ involvement in the process, see
BENEDICT, supra note 84, at 140 (“Anger filled the room when members gathered to
discuss the city council’s vote. They had done research, circulated petitions, organized
letter-writing campaigns, garnered positive publicity, mobilized citizens, attended
public hearings, and demonstrated strong opposition to the NLDC’s plan. They had
even produced an alternative plan. Nothing had worked . . . .”).
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The Supreme Court also highlighted the municipality’s compliance
with due process. 86 After reviewing how New London executed its
takings power, Justice Kennedy wrote in concurrence: “The city
complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate
review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.” 87 As for
the compensation requirement, at no point in Kelo’s long legal
journey did she argue that the compensation was flawed, or that she
and her neighbors were not offered the fair market value of their
property. For purposes of this Article, therefore, let us assume that
the compensation requirement was fully satisfied.
Evaluating Suzette Kelo’s case through the interplay model, it is
evident that the procedural and fairness safeguards met the requisite
high bar that resulted from weakening the public use safeguard. An
examination of the Court’s ruling in Kelo reveals that the Court
considered and implemented — even if unintentionally — the
interplay model proposed in this Article. The reason that the Court
approved New London’s taking, even though the public use
requirement was set at a relatively low threshold, was the
expropriation’s fulfillment of the other two requirements of the
interplay model.
Public use, though compromised, was not
eviscerated, and the other two safeguards were employed
scrupulously.
B.

Emerging Takings: Compromising Procedures

The Constitution binds the government’s power to take private
property with the duty to provide due process to owners. 88 Initially,
courts varied in how they applied procedural due process
requirements to government interference with private property. The
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property resolved this variance, cementing the constitutional
basis for applying due process rights to government takings
proceedings. 89
In Good Real Property, the Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires the government to afford owners notice and opportunity to

86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493.
87. Id. at 493.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”).
89. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993).
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be heard before seizing their property in a civil forfeiture case. 90 The
police found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Good’s home, and he
pleaded guilty to criminal charges. 91 Almost four-and-a-half years
later, the government seized Good’s property without prior notice or
an adversarial proceeding. 92 Good asserted that he was deprived of
his property without due process of law and that the forfeiture action
was invalid because it had not been timely commenced. 93 The
Supreme Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment guarantees that every property owner must receive
notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government
deprives him or her of property. 94
Though the case did not deal directly with the government’s power
to confiscate private property for public use, the Court’s conclusion
about the essence of Fifth Amendment due process provided solid
ground for recognizing due process rights in eminent domain
proceedings. 95 The Court’s discussion of the role that procedural
requirements play in preventing governmental abuse of takings power
was clear. The purpose of the right to prior notice and hearing,
Justice Kennedy wrote, “is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the
individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property . . . .”96
Good Real Property thus dispelled any uncertainty surrounding the
government’s duty to provide due process to property owners in
expropriation proceedings. The government is obligated to notify
owners of its intentions and to involve them in the takings process, all
to reduce the concern that the government will abuse its power. 97
This clear doctrine in mind begs the question: Can the government
legitimately compromise on its duty to provide owners with due
process in imperfect circumstances? Can an owner be deprived of his
due process rights — prior notice and hearing — in a case of
emergency?

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 47.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 48.
95. Hudson, supra note 26, at 1302.
96. Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–
81 (1972)).
97. Id. at 62; see also Hudson, supra note 26, at 1287.
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The Good Real Property Court provided an answer to this
question, suggesting that the general rule that mandates prior notice
and hearing might tolerate some exceptions. 98 But these exceptions,
which should only be recognized in “extraordinary situations where
some valid governmental interest is at stake,” 99 do not completely
excuse the government from its procedural obligations. Rather, they
ease implementation of procedural obligations by allowing the
government to postpone the hearing until after the taking is
executed. 100 The Good Real Property Court enforced procedural due
process as a barrier to governmental abuse of power while
simultaneously recognizing that imperfect situations may require
some lessening of — though not entirely eliminating — this duty.
This conclusion reflects the interplay model, which allows for only
partial realization of the procedural safeguard in order to
accommodate imperfect circumstances. 101 But the interplay model
advances a second condition: it is not enough to ensure that no
safeguard is entirely eliminated; the government must also raise the
bar for implementation of the other two safeguards. In other words,
if the government is to legitimize its failure to fully meet procedural
obligations, the taking should be for a vital public use and the owners
must be adequately compensated.
A careful reading of Good Real Property shows that the decision
complies with this second condition as well. In recognizing that there
might be circumstances that justify an exception to government’s duty
to provide due process in expropriation, Justice Kennedy embraced
criteria
proposed
in
another
Supreme
Court
ruling,
Mathews v. Eldridge. 102 In Mathews, the Court addressed whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that a
recipient of Social Security disability benefits be afforded an
opportunity for a hearing prior to termination of those benefits.103
The Mathews Court suggested that determining whether Fifth
Amendment due process requirements had been met in a particular
case cannot be done “technically” — that is, without considering time,
place, and circumstances. 104 Instead, the Court offered three criteria
to determine whether the burdens of due process were met in any

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.
Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, at 323.
Id. at 334–35.
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given case: “the private interest affected by the official action; the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures
used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the
Government’s interest, including the administrative burden that
additional procedural requirements would impose.” 105 The Mathews
analysis, adopted by the Good Real Property Court, supports the
connection between the three safeguards that make up the interplay
model: when the bar on one safeguard is lowered, it must be raised
for the other two.
According to the Mathews analysis, mitigating government’s
procedural obligations should align with the government’s interest in
executing the taking. In other words, the greater the interest of the
government — or the public — in executing the taking, the greater
the willingness to ease the procedural protections. This suggests that
the procedural requirements imposed on the government might be
mitigated only for the most essential public uses. The logic behind
this conclusion is self-evident: if the government is pressed to provide
some public good, and so seeks to weaken the procedural protections
it owes to property holders, the taking must be for the most essential
and urgent public needs. The government should not be able to ease
its procedural obligations to take property for noncritical purposes,
even if these projects would eventually benefit the public.
The Mathews analysis also impliedly supports the proposition that
mitigating government’s procedural obligations should be
conditioned on raising the bar for the efficiency safeguard. While
neither Mathews nor Good Real Property were dealing directly with
takings of real property — and, therefore, do not deal with
compensation to owners — they nonetheless relate to the link
between compromising government’s procedural obligations and
ensuring efficiency and aggregate welfare. 106 The Mathews analysis
specifically requires the government to consider the deprived private
interest, the costs of erroneous deprivation, the probable value of the
safeguards, and the administrative costs of the action. 107 These
considerations aim to achieve the same goal as the compensation
requirement in takings law — to ensure that the governmental action
will internalize the social costs involved. As both Mathews and Good
Real Property indicate, mitigating government’s procedural
obligations requires a strict examination of the impact this would

105. Id. at 335.
106. Id.; Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 44.
107. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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have on the overall efficiency of the action. This is reflected in the
interplay model: if the government mitigates its procedural
obligations it must simultaneously ensure strict implementation of the
efficiency safeguard. Thus, the Mathews analysis, adopted by the
Good Real Property Court, aligns with the interplay model’s second
condition — compromising the procedural safeguard requires raising
the bar for the implementation of both the fairness safeguard (i.e.
only essential public uses) and the efficiency safeguard (i.e. full
compensation).
C.

Budgetary Constraints: Compromising Compensation

Another convention that the interplay model urges us to rethink is
that government takings ought to be executed only in exchange for
fair market value compensation. The “just compensation” clause of
the Fifth Amendment was interpreted by courts as a duty imposed on
the appropriating authorities to provide owners with the fair market
value of the taken property. 108 The courts established fair market
value as the universal standard for just compensation, which is now a
prerequisite to legitimate property confiscation. 109
But what if the government cannot pay owners the fair market
value of their property? The most prominent example of such a
situation is in emergencies — imperfect circumstances. Consider, for
example, a serious disaster that requires the local government to
perform some large-scale activities. Among other things, the local
government is required to expropriate land or demolish structures on
private property to cope with the disaster and its consequences. The
costs of dealing with such a disaster likely exceed the financial
capacity of governments, particularly small, local governments. But
the importance of rapid and effective assistance from the authorities
in emergency events is clear. Faced with this impossible situation,
how must the government act? Should it expropriate private
property even though it cannot pay the fair market value to the
owners, or should it limit its relief and refrain from undertaking

108. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (“The statement in that
opinion . . . that ‘no private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full
and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner’ aptly expresses the scope of the
constitutional safeguard against the uncompensated taking or use of private property
for public purposes . . . . That equivalent is the market value of the property at the
time of the taking, contemporaneously paid in money.”); see also United States v. 50
Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407–08 (1878).
109. Boom Co., 98 U.S. at 407–08.
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activities that exceed its budget? And, if we allow government to
take property in order to provide services to the public regardless of
its financial capability, should this be limited only to emergencies?
Current takings jurisprudence distinguishes between cases of
emergency in which the government decides to confiscate private
property and circumstances where the government chooses to destroy
When the government
property to thwart a grave threat. 110
confiscates property, it is obligated to compensate the owner with an
amount equal to the fair market value of the property. 111 But when
the government destroys the property, the owner is not entitled to
compensation. 112 This destruction exception, which denies property
owners’ right to compensation, is embedded in the law as the
“necessity” exemption or the “non-compensation principle.” 113 This
principle has faced criticism, mainly because it leaves property owners
uncompensated even though their property was destroyed. 114 The
importance of this principle, however, only becomes more acute as
governments around the world are forced to deal with severe weather
or control the spread of diseases that endanger public health and law
enforcement. 115 These extreme scenarios can be thought of as
imperfect, emergency cases that justify denying compensation to the
landowner when the authorities destroy their property.
The application of the non-compensation principle to emergency
situations has garnered much criticism from commentators, 116 but
aiming to identify its underlying justification reveals important
implications in takings law. Examining the history of the non-

110. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952)
(“[T]he common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril . . . the
sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of
many and the lives of many more could be saved.”).
111. See Olson, 292 U.S. at 255.
112. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. at 149.
113. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 118–19 (2002).
114. See Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public
Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127, 127 (2013); see generally Derek T. Muller, Note, “As

Much upon Tradition as upon Principle”: A Critique of the Privilege of Necessity
Destruction Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481 (2006). For a

similar example from a century ago, see Henry C. Hall & John H. Wigmore,

Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop the Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL.

L. REV. 501, 514–24 (1907).
115. Lee, supra note 66, at 399–401.
116. See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 367–68 (2d ed.
2011); Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54
B.C. L. REV. 127 (2013); see generally Derek T. Muller, Note, “As Much upon

Tradition as upon Principle”: A Critique of the Privilege of Necessity Destruction
Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481 (2006).
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compensation principle in American law, Brian Lee suggests that the
principle provides governments with an exemption from paying
compensation in emergencies not only because of administrative
difficulties, but also because they lack the resources required to pay
full compensation to owners. 117 Lee further argues that the noncompensation principle does not require the adoption of an “all or
nothing” compensation policy; rather, it allows partial compensation,
subject to the government’s fiscal capabilities. 118
The recognition that a government’s budgetary limitations can
justify partial or no compensation ought to apply beyond the
boundaries of property destruction to thwart a threat. Indeed, it is
sensible to apply this justification even in cases where the government
is required to expropriate property, rather than destroy it, for public
needs. Consider, for example, a local authority that is required to
provide its residents with sidewalks, roads, educational institutions,
medical institutions, and workplaces. It will be relatively easy for an
affluent local authority that has sufficient economic means to provide
these needs: the lands required to provide sidewalks or roads will be
expropriated from private owners and, in return, the authority will
pay the landowners the full market value of the taken property. But
this is not the case for poorer, struggling local governments that, due
to budgetary constraints, cannot pay the full market value in
exchange for property, and thus might not be able to supply essential
public goods. In such circumstances, strict compliance to full
compensation that matches the market value will undoubtedly impair
the ability of poor local authorities to support the vital needs of
residents. Denying poorer municipalities the flexibility to expropriate
property with only partial compensation, such that they can overcome
their budgetary limitations, does not contradict the essence of the
takings power. 119 As stated, the power to expropriate property is
intended to enable authorities to overcome structural failures so they
may provide for the essential needs of society. 120 Ignoring budgetary
limitations of local authorities, therefore, leaves them hollow, with
empty power, while their residents remain without necessary services.
While this concern is relevant to any authority that is struggling with
significant budgetary limitations, it increases in cases of emergency,

117. Lee, supra note 66, at 453.
118. Id. at 407–10.
119. For a similar argument in the context of zoning and regulatory takings, see
Jonathan B. Sallet, The Problem of Municipal Liability for Zoning and Land-Use
Regulation, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 465, 465–66, 477–78 (1982).
120. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
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when even economically well-established authorities may find
themselves struggling due to the amount of public assistance they
have to provide.
The interplay model proposed in this Article seeks to address
precisely these imperfect situations. Government’s power to take
private property is primarily intended to enable it to overcome
failures that would otherwise prevent it from providing for its
constituency’s most vital needs. The interplay model can address and
justify complex situations in which authorities are forced to pay
property owners only partial compensation that amounts to less than
the fair market value of the property. Compromising on fair market
value, however, raises concerns about the efficiency of the taking.121
Recall that the compensation requirement primarily aims to
safeguard against inefficient takings, which mostly result from
authorities’ lack of internalization of all social costs. 122 However, the
interplay model mitigates the concern that authorities will abuse
budgetary limitations as an excuse to take private property at prices
lower than the market value. This is because of the two fundamental
conditions that underpin the interplay model: that all three safeguards
remain at least partially in effect, and that lowering the bar for one of
the safeguards demands strict adherence to the requirements of the
other two.
Applying these conditions to circumstances when governments
struggle with budgetary limitations, but still have to expropriate
property to provide social needs, reveals that partial-compensation
takings may still be properly executed. This is the case when the
taking is only for the most essential societal purposes, in which the
public need is clearly defined, and with full respect for the procedural
rights of landowners. The interplay model allows authorities
struggling with budgetary limitations, which might risk their ability to
provide citizens with essential needs, to overcome one of current
takings law’s paradoxes. It allows for a rethinking of the reasons
underlying government’s takings power in the first place — that is,
the desire to allow the government to satisfy the needs of society.
CONCLUSION
Imperfect circumstances such as emergencies, crises, and budgetary
limitations threaten government’s ability to use its takings power to
provide for citizens’ needs. Strict adherence to takings law’s
121. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
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incorporated safeguards — due process, the public use requirement,
and compensation — may deprive the government of the ability to
properly provide these public needs, precisely in times of crisis, when
these needs are particularly important or threatened. This Article
proposes a model that highlights the interplay between all three of
takings law’s inherent safeguards. This interplay model maintains
and provides a normative justification for compromise, when
circumstances require, on one of the safeguards. Such a compromise,
when implemented according to the interplay model’s two conditions,
allows governments to provide the public its vital needs even in
imperfect circumstances. It also provides an explanation of current
eminent domain jurisprudence that seemingly stands at odds with
takings law and allows for a rethinking of old conventions.

